Creating Contestation: Adversarial Politics and the Early Modern Origins of Electoral Institutions
Abstract
Creating Contestation: Adversarial Politics and Institutional Change in Early Modern England asks where one of the defining features of modern elections—public, adversarial political choice—came from. For much of England's early parliamentary history, representatives were not selected through competitive elections in the modern sense. Instead, candidates, patrons, and other local elites frequently bargained over who would be returned to Parliament, with the electorate largely affirming choices already made. During the long seventeenth century, these arrangements began to break down and contested elections became increasingly common.
I argue that this transformation cannot be understood simply as the electoral expression of a singular social or ideological cleavage. Contests emerged from failures of coordination among political elites, particularly conflicts among patrons whose authority to nominate representatives had previously rested on relatively stable hierarchies. The book investigates why those arrangements became harder to sustain, examining changes in economic power, religion, Crown–elite relations, the value of parliamentary office, and beliefs about hierarchy, deference, and the legitimacy of open political conflict. The paper uses extensive quantitative data on contestation, candidates, their challengers and the social and economic conditions of England's long 17th century drawn from primary and secondary sources.
The book uses this history to develop a broader account of how decentralized, informal institutions change. Institutional theories often identify conditions under which one arrangement should replace another without explaining how that transition actually unfolds, particularly when institutions are not centralized. I distinguish between the breakdown of an established practice within particular political relationships and the subsequent process through which new behavior spreads, generates new expectations, and becomes regularized. The English case is especially revealing because this transformation was not linear: electoral contestation expanded dramatically, then receded, and eventually became widespread again under different political and social conditions. By tracing these changes from individual electoral disputes to broader patterns of political behavior, the book explains the origins a central institution of democracy, but also the dynamic process through which institutions emerge, stabilize, and transform again.